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FEDERAL RULE 23-AN EXERCISE IN UTILITY
JOHN

P.

FULLAM*

A

NY ATTEMPT to review the law of class actions within the
compass of this brief presentation necessarily involves all of
the weaknesses of a "survey course": repeating much that is obvious, omitting much that is important and leaving penetrating insights to more profound treatises.
The title of this article reflects this authors personal view that,
on balance, rule 23 is an extremely useful device. But it must be
acknowledged that the class action rule poses great difficulties in
application; many lawyers and judges who would be inclined to
add a letter to the last word of the title.
A class action under federal rule 23 is simply a method of handling a large number of related claims in one large lawsuit rather
than in a large number of small lawsuits. Ideally, the threshold determinations required of the court should be made with a single
objective: to dispose justly of all claims with the minimum burden
on the totality of judicial resources, including courts, lawyers and
litigants. These determinations include resolving the following questions: how many are too many claims to handle in the case; how
many are too few to deserve designation as a class; do the common
issues really predominate over individual issues; are management
problems insurmountable; and what is really the best way to handle
the entire bundle of disputes?
In committing these and similar questions to the discretion of
the district judge, rule 23 undoubtedly achieves the valid objective
of insuring flexibility. No rigid rule could accommodate the variety
of factual situations and competing equitable considerations that
* B.S., Villanova University; J.D., Harvard University; United States District
Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The author decided the brass pipe antitrust litigation, reported sub. norn. Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968) and Hobbs v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50
F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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the complexities of modem life and the ingenuity of counsel can
bring into focus. The greater the scope of permissible judicial discretion, however, the less likely is it that similar cases will be decided alike. Moreover, achieving equality of justice should be the
ultimate goal of adjective as well as substantive law.
One striking feature of rule 23 is the degree of control given a
judge over the magnitude of his own work-load. Happily, this is
not usually translated into "How much work can I avoid?", but
rather "How can I best utilize the totality of available resources?" It
can be argued, however, that courts should adjudicate the claims
of litigants, instead of making choices among cases to be entertained. Since class actions may be the only feasible way to right
large numbers of small wrongs, perhaps judges are given too much
of a legislative, policy-making role when they are empowered to
grant or withhold the class action remedy and thus to control the
direction and scope of challenges to the "establishment."
This article will attempt to review briefly some recurring problem
areas in the application of rule 23. Those areas that have evoked
differing judicial responses will be given particular scrutiny with
occasional suggestions concerning acceptable solutions.
I.

SIZE OF CLASS

The first prerequisite for class action treatment prescribed by
rule 23 relates to the size of the proposed class; the class must be
"so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."' The
burden is on the proponents of the class to show that this requirement is met.' Moreover, uncertainty about whether the class is large
enough has been held to be sufficient reason for denying class action
treatment," at least until the uncertainty is removed.4
The numerosity requirement was not altered by the 1966 amendments to rule 23. Deciding what number of legal entities it would
be "impracticable" to join individually necessarily involves ad hoc
considerations, and the reported decisions, both before and since
the new rule, provide imprecise guidelines. Classes as small as thir1

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1).

2DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968).
'Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 53 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
4

Kinzler v. N.Y. Stock Exchange, 53 F.R.D. 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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teen,' twenty-four,' and thirty-five to seventy' have been approved.
But a class of forty-eight has been held to be too small to warrant
class action treatment;8 and one district court has even held that a
class of 350 did not satisfy the numerosity requirement, since litigation involving that number of claimants had been handled on an
intervention basis in state courts."
If all of the members of the class are not readily identifiable,
practical convenience may dictate approval of class action treatment for somewhat smaller numbers of potential claimants than
when the members of the class are identifiable. But even when all
members are identified, there would seem to be no compelling reason to insist upon individual joinder, if to do so would impose undue burdens upon the court (e.g., docket clerks) or upon counsel
and their staffs.
Ordinarily, the parties adverse to the class have little to gain by
objecting to class action treatment on the ground that the class is
too small; indeed, it may often be advantageous to both sides to
permit the action to proceed on a class basis. Of course, the number
of potential class members can be so small that even the most generous definition of the term "impracticable" cannot reasonably be
said to apply to the prospect of individual joinder, or so small that
even the minimal burdens of class action procedures ought not to
be assumed. Modest reductions in paper-work alone clearly cannot
justify departure from the normal pattern of direct litigation.
The language of rule 23 does not seem to permit relaxation of
the numerosity requirement on the basis of factors unrelated to
class size, such as the amounts of individual claims or venue problems. Under a literal reading of rule 23 if the class is small enough
to permit individual joinder on a workable basis, the fact that individual claims are too modest to warrant the expense of such
litigation is immaterial. Nevertheless, it is likely that these exIDale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531 (D. N.H.
1971) (defendant class, not all amenable to process otherwise).
OPhiladelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., et al., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
1Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Industries, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
8Carlisle v. LTV Electrosystems, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 237 (N.D. Tex. 1972).
'State of Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal.
1969).
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traneous practical considerations may have some influence upon
a court's discretion in the matter.'"
It would be unrealistic to expect all judges to agree on precisely
what number may, and what number may not, join individually
without excessive inconvenience. If any norm can be derived from
analysis of reported decisions, it would seem to be this: the line of
demarcation between classes that are presumptively large enough
and those that are presumptively too small for class treatment
probably falls somewhere in the range of twenty to thirty potential
members, in actions for damages. It must be conceded, however,
that this attempted distillation may well represent merely the individual view of the writer concerning what constitutes a reasonable
rule-of-thumb.
In actions for injunctive or declaratory relief under 23 (b) (1) or
23(b) (2), the numerosity requirements are the same, at least in
theory; but since the distinctions between class and non-class treatment in these cases usually have less practical significance than in
rule 23(b)(3) actions, decisions about whether to approve class
treatment are often somewhat perfunctory, perhaps with more
flexibility in assessment of numerosity standards. Indeed, if the
representative plaintiffs are likely to pursue the litigation in any
event-and this is usually the case- the parties adverse to the
class have little reason to object to class treatment.
Rule 23 does not expressly impose any maximum limit to the
size of a class; any restriction on size must emerge from considerations of manageability under rule 23(b) (3) (D).
II.

EXISTENCE AND PREDOMINANCE OF COMMON QUESTIONS

The further requirement of rule 23(a) that there be "questions
of law or fact common to the class" is virtually self-explanatory.11
In view of the provisions of rule 23 (c) (4) permitting class action
treatment with respect to particular issues, and authorizing plurality
of classes and sub-classes, it can be said fairly that most proposed
class actions qualify for some kind of class action treatment under
this minimum standard.
In the case of rule 23(b) (3) actions, the court must further find
"See,

e.g., Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531

(D. N.H. 1971).
"1FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2).
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that the common questions "predominate over any questions affecting only individual members."' 2 It is doubtful whether this language
really adds much to rule 23 in light of rule 23 (c) (4). Since an
action may be maintained as a class action for particular issues,
predominance of common questions in those issues would seem inevitable if they actually are common to the class. Perhaps the predominance requirement is best interpreted as cautioning that the
"particular issues" selected for class treatment should not be too
narrowly defined.
Since a lawsuit is essentially composed of three elements, wrongful conduct, causation (impact) and damages, the first element is
almost certain to involve predominant common issues; the second
element is quite likely to involve common issues, which may or
may not predominate; and, except when unusual methods of calculating damages are employed, the third element is almost certain
to involve largely individual issues. Consequently, it would seem
desirable to permit class treatment only when the common questions are predominant within the context of one or more of the
three basic elements mentioned above. This is not to suggest that
all 'liability' or 'impact' issues must be common to the class. Nevertheless, troublesome problems may arise (e.g., in applying statutes
of limitation to the claims of passive class members) if the only
issues asserted by the class representative do not substantially determine liability to the class. Perhaps this is but another way of saying that a class action would not be "superior" within the meaning
of rule 23 (b) (3) if separate litigation of controlling liability issues
would be necessary in any event; and of emphasizing the importance of early determination of class action questions, and early
notice to the class.
III.

ADEQUACY OF REPRESENTATION

The class representative must have claims or defenses that typify
those of the class;" he must "fairly and adequately" represent the
class; and, of course, he must not have interests that conflict with
the interests of other class members."
"FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

13FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
4
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4).

"1Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
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Thus, it has been held that a trade association having no typical
claim of its own cannot act as a representative of its members in
class litigation." More recent cases appear to relax this requirement,
however, at least in the area of civil rights." And while some courts
have insisted that class representatives in cases involving racial discrimination must themselves be objects of the precise discrimination
complained of,18 the Supreme Court has held otherwise."
There is no requirement that the representative must himself
have a substantial claim; this criterion might well frustrate the salutary purposes of rule 23.20
Termination of the representative's membership in the class by
reason of factors beyond his control does not preclude recovery by
the other class members,' nor, according to some decisions, does
mooting of the individual claim of the class representative.22 In
these situations, adequate representatives can be substituted.
Among the situations in which conflicts of interest seem particularly likely to arise are those in which the total resources available
to satisfy judgments are less than the total of the recoveries that
vigorous representation of the class would produce, and those in
which different kinds of damages may properly be sought by various class members. In addition, conflicts, in varying degrees of
intensity, frequently arise in connection with proposed compromise
settlements and are almost inevitable in connection with awards
of counsel fees.2
It is to be expected that interesting and difficult problems of conflicting interests and re-definition of classes may arise as class ac" Alabama Independent Service Station Ass'n v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 28
F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ala. 1939); Farmers Coop. Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 133 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1942).
"Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d
Cir. 1968).
8
Palmer v. Thompson, 391 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'd, 403 U.S. 217
(1970).
9
Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968), afl'd 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D.
Ala. 1966) (three-judge court).
"Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
"Wymelenberg v. Syman, 54 F.R.D. 198 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (death of wife
of representative of class of would-be plaintiffs in divorce).
2
2Thomas v. Clarke, 54 F.R.D. 245 (D. Minn. 1971); but see Caldwell v.
Craighead, 432 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 953 (1970);
Committee to Free the Fort Dix 38 v. Collins, 429 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1970).
2
' See Part VI of the text.
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tions in the area of ecology proliferate. There is no provision for
"opting-out" of a rule 23(b) (1) or rule 23(b) (2) class," yet not
all of the inhabitants or taxpayers in a given community may wish
to enjoin an industrial polluter whose operations are a mainstay of
the local economy. In a somewhat analogous case involving a pension fund dispute, the First Circuit has held that the named plaintiff
could represent those beneficiaries sharing his views, while the defendants could represent the beneficiaries taking a contrary position.' A rational re-definition of the class or classes on the basis of
objective criteria can more readily be achieved, however, in the
case of beneficiaries affected differently by a pension plan than in
matters of ecology. It seems doubtful that "all residents who want
to get an injunction against X Company" would be an adequate
description of a class under rule 23.
It has been held that when eighty per cent of the stockholders of
a corporation oppose plaintiff's attempts to enjoin a merger, plaintiff is an inadequate representative because of his conflicting interests, hence a class action is inapproprite.' Whether this approach
should be adopted in the hypothetical ecology situation; whether it
would be appropriate if a majority agreed with the plaintiff; and
whether the views of the class members could be accurately ascertained, are questions that the developing case law may ultimately
answer. Perhaps the dilemma could be avoided by treating the litigation under rule 23 (b) (3), thus permitting withdrawals from the
class; if so, it might be desirable to minimize notice requirements.
IV. SUPERIORITY OF CLASS ACTION; MANAGEMENT DIFFICULTIES

Class action status may not be accorded under rule 23(b) (3)
unless the judge finds that this would be "superior to other available
27
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
In making a finding on this subject, the court is required to consider, inter alia, "the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.""5 It is these areas in which judicial dis24
E.g., Mungin v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 318 F. Supp. 720 (M.D. Fla.
1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 897 (1971).

Dierks v. Thompson, 414 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1969).
Schy v. Susquehanna Corp., 419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 826 (1970).
21

27

FED.

28 FED.

R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
R. Civ. P. 23.
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cretion is least trammeled by articulated standards, and in which
occur the greatest disparities.
To some extent, inconsistencies in treatment of these questions
can undoubtedly be traced to differences in judicial philosophy.
But this author suggests that much of the seeming contradiction in
judicial pronouncements on these subjects arises not from different
answers to the same questions but from differing perceptions of
the questions to be answered.
It bears emphasis that management difficulties are not an independent ground for denial of class treatment but merely one factor
to be weighed in determining whether a class action is superior to
other available methods for handling the controversy. The choice
is not between class action treatment and no litigation; the judge is
not authorized to indulge the hope that the controversy will simply
vanish. Rather, what is required is a survey of "other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy""
for purposes of comparison; only if there is some equally promising
alternative can class action treatment ordinarily be denied." One
of the principal objects of rule 23, after all, is "to facilitate the joining of multiple small actions that would otherwise not be brought,
and to prevent repetitious litigation of claims."'"
Among the alternatives to be considered are: (i) intervention
under rule 24; this is, of course, the fundamental alternative posed
in applying rule 23(a) criteria and presumably will have been
ruled out as a totally satisfactory solution before reaching rule
23(b) (3) issues; (ii) separate individual actions, with agreement
for "test case" disposition; this requires unusually cooperative counsel, and may involve its own management difficulties; (iii) separate
individual actions, with application of expanding concepts of collateral estoppel.' This alternative may prove acceptable in many
situations but, like the "test case" approach, does not reduce the
number of suits filed; and (iv) separate individual actions, with
pretrial consolidation under section 1407, perhaps followed by
29

FED. R.

Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

1 Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972), reversing 50
F.R.D. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
31 Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 414 F.2d 311, 317 (1st Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1037 (1969).
12 Cf. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Foundation, 402 U.S.
313 (1971).
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transfer for all purposes under section 1404; or with transfers under
section 1404 followed by general consolidation. In reality, these
suggested alternatives are not alternatives at all in most situations,
but rather methods of handling related class actions and of insuring
uniform class determinations in related litigation. If the prerequisites of a class action are present, the availability of sections 1404
and 1407 provide no reason to deny class treatment.
Some kinds of cases fit within the class action mold less comfortably than others. Traditionally, tort claims for personal injury,
or defamation, for example, have been individually litigated; this
is not surprising in view of the usual magnitude of each claim and
its importance in the life of the individual. Moreover, the contingent-fee concept has generally made it feasible for claimants to litigate regardless of their financial resources. In Hobbs v. Northeast
Airlines," these factors, plus certain conflict-of-laws problems and
the related desirability of preserving opportunities for forum choices, were relied upon in denying class treatment of claims arising
from an air disaster. The developing pattern in these cases-pretrial transfer under section 1407, followed by section 1404 transfer
for trial of liability issues-was followed in Hobbs and worked
well. As plane capacities increase, however, major-disaster cases
may yet arise in which class treatment would be appropriate, particularly if uniform damage limits are applicable.
The correct choice between class treatment and some other method depends upon the number of potential class members, the magnitude of their individual claims, their enthusiasm for individual
litigation and, perhaps, an assessment of whether some discernible
public policy would be undermined if a substantial percentage of
the class failed to litigate.
The essential difficulty with these alternatives to class treatment
is that they require the separate assertion of individual claims, thus
necessarily foreclosing a principal goal of rule 23. If the claims are
small they cannot feasibly be asserted individually; if the claims
are numerous, multiplicity of suits cannot be avoided regardless of
amount of the claim. While it is sometimes suggested that the absence of a practicable alternative method of asserting numerous
small claims is the concern of the litigants rather than the court,'
"Hobbs

v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 76 (E.D. Pa. 1970).

34 Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972) (dictum).
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this author submits that it is difficult to square this view with the
language of rule 23. Moreover, irrespective of one's personal assessment of the policy issues involved, nevertheless rule 23 bears the
imprimatur of the Supreme Court and Congress.
Rather than relegate small claimants to nonexistent or ephemeral
alternative remedies, this author suggests that, when all else fails,
re-definition of classes to bring the litigation into manageable size
is a workable solution. By defining classes in geographical terms,
for example, a series of parallel lawsuits, each of which is manageable, can be established.' Discovery and other pretrial matters
can be handled in the usual way under section 1407; if necessary,
this could perhaps be done on a regional, rather than national,
basis, at least for some phases of the lawsuit.
Unless a similar process of fragmentation and load-distribution is
adopted, there will continue to be decisions that reject class actions
outright, on grounds of sheer magnitude.'
V. NOTICE TO CLASS MEMBERS
Notice to members of a rule 23 (b) (3) class is mandatory under
rule 23 (c) (2), which prescribes "the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who
can be identified through reasonable effort."" Much of the initial
apprehension about the unseemliness and impracticability of a
court-directed notice program" has now evaporated in the realization that it is entirely possible to adopt a neutral form of notice,
issued under the aegis of the court but without direct court involvement. A common technique is to have responses sent to a
post-office box address in care of the clerk of the court, and to have
a small committee of counsel, from both sides of the case, review
"Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D.
Pa. 1968). A similar result has been achieved, on a much larger scale and per-

haps not solely occasioned by management difficulties, in the antibiotic drug litigation, in re Consolidated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions,
333 F. Supp. 278, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), mandamus denied, 449 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1971); see also West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
" E.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D. N.J.
1971).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
"School District of Philadelphia v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 267 F.
Supp. 1001 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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and tabulate the returns and take appropriate action; any disputes
that arise are resolved by the court.
The principal problem areas that remain deal with determining
the appropriate means of notice, financing the notice program and
prescribing the contents of the notices.
It is impossible within the limits of this presentation to canvass
all of the difficulties inherent in attempting to communicate adequately with extremely large numbers of unknown persons. Trade
association membership-lists, various specialized directories, and
other similar groups can provide a starting-point and the records of
the defendants may furnish much useful information. Ultimately,
there can be resort to publication, perhaps including broadcast
media.
The costs of providing adequate notice can be substantial. Federal courts have been reminded by the Administrative Office of
United States Courts that the franking privilege should not be used
for class action notices, unless on a prior-reimbursement basis.
Ordinarily, the initial costs should be advanced by the proponents
of the class, a requirement that imposes no undue burden in most
cases, particularly if a goodly number of class members have already
expressed interest in the litigation. There can be cases, however,
in which this advancement of costs is impossible; it then becomes
necessary to consider whether all or part of the costs should be imposed upon the parties opposing the class. If class treatment will
probably be approved and there is a reasonable likelihood that the
class will ultimately prevail on the merits, notice costs can properly
be assessed against the parties adverse to the class. In these situations, notice can be deferred for a reasonable time to permit discovery on the class action issues, and perhaps limited discovery on
the merits. Or alternatively, a hearing on these issues can be required."9
The notice must cover the three subjects specified in rule
23 (c) (2): (i) the right to withdraw, (ii) the binding effect of the
judgment otherwise, and (iii) the right to enter an appearance
through counsel. Frequently, disputes arise concerning what additional information should be included. Courts must be vigilant to
insure that neither side succeeds in perverting the notice to serve
its own ends.
' 9 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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The purpose of the notice is to afford potential class members
the opportunity to make intelligent decisions with respect to
whether to remain in the class. The notice should not urge these
potential class members to participate or to discourage them from
participation. Accordingly, there should be nothing in the notice
that might be interpreted as forecasting the probable outcome of the
lawsuit, or as indicating court sponsorship of either side. This
author sees no objection to including the names and addresses of
counsel, so long as both sides are treated equally, but responses
relating to withdrawals or other matters should be directed to be
sent to the 'neutral' post-office box address. References to counsel
fees and costs, however, should probably be omitted. If any mention
of potential liability for these items is made, then it should be
coupled with the advice that they will be under the control of the
court, and perhaps that they can be expected not to exceed a stated
percentage of the recovery. If counsel for the representative parties
are committed to a contingent-fee approach, then notice concerning
fees should also be mentioned. Needless to say, notice that the action
stems from a previous or pending criminal prosecution, or that
substantial offers in settlement have already been received, should
not be included, except, perhaps, with the unanimous consent of
the parties.
In this author's view, it is entirely appropriate, and may often
be desirable, to utilize the notice program not only for the purpose
of excluding those who opt-out, but also for the purpose of learning
the true dimensions of the litigation by identifying those class members who actually intend to follow through with claims for damages.
Not only is this information concerning the dimensions of the litigation essential for the ultimate disposition of any recovery (in
most cases, at least) but it is extremely valuable to have this information at an early stage, both in connection with management
evaluation and in connection with settlement discussions. The initial
notice to the class provides a convenient opportunity to obtain this
additional "show of hands."
Two points should be made in this connection: (i) This is not
equivalent to imposing an "opt-in" requirement. Those who do not
request exclusion remain members of the class and will be bound
by the judgment in the action; but if, after adequate notice, they
really are not interested in the matter, their claims can properly be
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disposed of on procedural grounds rather than on the merits. (ii)
This is not equivalent to imposing a requirement that individual
class members assume any inordinate burden. No elaborate proofof-claim or detailed statement of claim should be required at this
point, but merely a post-card return expressing a willingness to be
numbered among the participants."0
It is common practice to use the class action notice to give and
obtain information in addition to that specified in 23 (c) (2).1
For example, in one phase of the antibiotic drug litigation, '
the notice advised class members that if they did not file individual
claims by a certain date, they would be deemed to have authorized
the state attorney-general to act in their behalf.
VI. DISCOVERY FROM CLASS MEMBERS
Under present federal discovery practice some kinds of discovery
may be had from just about anyone. In class actions, the issue is
not whether there may be discovery from 'absent' class members,
but rather whether they may properly be subjected to the same
kinds of discovery, and with the same kinds of sanctions, as the representative parties. In short, are all class members "parties" to the
litigation within the meaning of rule 37. '
Since these class members will be bound by the judgment; since
rule 19" provides that actions must be brought by or on behalf of
the real parties in interest; and since rule 23(a) states that "one
or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all. . . "' it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that class members are indeed "parties" to the litigation, at least in
a broad sense. And in the classifications embodied in rule 37, class
members seem to fit more closely the designation "parties" than the
designation "a deponent who is not a party."
To say, however, that party discovery requirements may be applied to absent class members does not mean that this should hap'This procedure was used in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass
Co., 43 F.R.D. 452 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
'E.g., Knight v. Board of Education, 48 F.R.D. 108 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).

"West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871
43 FED. R. Civ. P.
"FED. R. Civ. P.
" FED. R. Civ. P.

(1971).
37.

19.
23(a).
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pen routinely. The special circumstances of class actions must be
considered, as must the true purposes of both rule 23 and the discovery rules. It would be clearly improper to permit litigants to
frustrate the beneficent purposes of either or both sets of rules by
their use of discovery techniques.
It would seem, therefore, that no discovery should be permitted
from absent class members unless and until it is clear that the information sought cannot be obtained from representative parties;
that no discovery from absent class members should be permitted
unless both its purpose and its effect is the disclosure of information
which is essential for the proper disposition of the litigation; and
that whenever the discovery from absent class members is permitted, the burdens resulting from the discovery must not be disproportionate in relation to the class member's financial stake in the
litigation.
There is authority for the proposition that, when all of these requirements are met, the ultimate sanction of dismissal with prejudice may properly be invoked to bar the claims of uncooperative
class members."
VII.

COMPROMISE SETTLEMENTS

Rule 23 (e) makes it clear that no class action may be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court and that notice
of the proposed settlement or dismissal must be given to all members of the class. An alleged class action should be treated as a class
action until a contrary determination is made by the court." It is
therefore preferable that the class action question should be resolved independently of, and in advance of, issues relating to proposed settlement.
The potential for abuse of the class action device is obvious. The
threat of a class action for damages is a potent weapon, and many
"threat" cases are filed for the principal purpose of coercing a gen" Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 450 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1971)
(rule 23 permits discovery from absent class members when necessary or helpful). But see Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 73,946 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (use of interrogatories to absent class members would end the usefulness of rule 23); Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, 15 Fed. Rules. Serv. 2d 23d.5, 905

(W.D. Ky. 1971).
4 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161, 169 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S.
950 (1970); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324,
326 (E.D. Pa. 1967).
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erous settlement of a non-meritorious claim. Conversely, defendants
may be inclined to escape their legitimate obligations to the class
by buying-off the class representatives.
For these reasons, proposed settlements in advance of the class
action determination should automatically be viewed with suspicion. In addition, attempts to avoid decision of the class action issue by amending the pleadings to strike class allegations," dropping
a party defendant, ' weak opposition to motions to strike class allegations,"0 or unopposed motions for dismissal or summary judgment 1 would also be suspect.
The court has a responsibility to the absent class members to protect their interests from being prejudiced by unfair compromise
settlements. Accordingly, the relevant facts must be disclosed and,
of course, there must be an adequate opportunity for the airing of
any objections." In one case,"' the court's initial refusal to approve
a settlement of 1.8 million dollars because of inadequate information resulted in a final settlement [after further facts came to light]
in the sum of three million dollars.
Related to settlement issues is the question of award of counsel
fees. The potential for abuse in this area must also be recognized,
but over-reaction to the supposed dangers should also be avoided.
Assuming the usual situation, in which counsel for the representative parties also represents most of the absent class members, counsel's fees and expenses should, of course, be fairly allocated among
all who benefited from his labors. But in determining what the attorney's labors are worth, and how the costs should be allocated,
counsel in a sense occupies a position of conflict. This is true to
some extent in all attorney-client fee determinations (most clients
are in effect un-represented, in theory, in the discussions), but the
conflict is exacerbated in class actions by the absence of a close attorney-client relationship on a personal-contact basis, by the possi4E.g., Yaffe v. Detroit Steel Corp., 50 F.R.D. 481 (N.D. fll. 1970).
49

E.g.,
(E.D. Pa.
5'E.g.,
51 E.g.,

Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co., 42 F.R.D. 324
1967).
Berger v. Purolator Products, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Laurenzano v. Texaco, Inc., CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. S 92,950

(S.D.N.Y. 1971).

51Young v. Katz, 447 F.2d 431 (5th Cir. 1971); Norman v. McKee, 290 F.
Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Calif. 1968), aff'd, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
53 Percondi v. Riker-Maxson Corp., 50 F.R.D. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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ble conflict between the class representative and other class members on the allocation issue and frequently by the magnitude of the
sums of money involved in the entire transaction.
Thus the determination and allocation of counsel fees requires
close supervision by the court to insure fairness. But if the individual net recoveries by claimants are satisfactory to the class members, and reasonably approximate their actual damages, and if all
claimants are treated alike, then a counsel fee should not be regarded as excessive merely because it seems generous in terms of hourly
rates for the time spent. So long as civil actions for damages remain
a significant tool for enforcement of salutary statutes and regulations, the notion that there must be sufficient compensation to provide incentive for these 'private attorneys-general' cannot be discarded.
VIII.

CONTROLLING COMMUNICATIONS

Both because of the unique relationship between class-action
counsel and his unknown clients, and because questions of claimsolicitation, maintenance and champerty have not yet been legalized, it is generally deemed prudent to prohibit direct or indirect
communications between counsel and the representative on the one
hand, and absent members of the class on the other. An exception,
however, would be the communication from the absent class member with court approval." In many districts local court rules have
been adopted to that effect. It is desirable to impose similar restrictions upon counsel for the parties opposing the class for obvious
reasons.
While these restrictions were initially greeted with protest in some
cases, experience has shown that the foregoing limitations do not
have any adverse effect upon the proper functions of counsel; legitimate communications are, of course, freely approved by the
courts.
IX.

DETERMINING DAMAGES; 'FLUID RECOVERY'; PARENS PATRIAE

When liability to a class of plaintiffs has been established or conceded, and the class contains thousands, even millions, of members,
14See
ed. 1971).

MANUAL

ON COMPLEX AND

MULTI-DISTRICT LITIGATION,

§ 1.61 (rev.
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the assessment of damages is indeed a formidable task. As previously discussed,' this author is convinced that the problem can be
greatly simplified by early weeding out the disinterested members,
leaving only the claims that are actually being asserted. But this is
not the only possible view of the matter;, about all that can be said
with confidence is that the law is still evolving.
Can the class representative establish the correct amount of damages owed to unidentified class members? In many cases, a reasonably close approximation of the correct figure can probably be arrived at without participation by the silent members. But does the
representative have the right to assert such claims? And does he
have the right to collect the money? Rule 23 is unclear, however,
concerning the extent of the representative's permissible involvement in these matters.
If the action has been approved for class treatment only with
respect to liability issues, it is difficult to see how the class representative acquires standing to pursue damage determinations. Further refinement of the order approving class treatment might make
this a closer question, however; for example, by specifying certain
damage issues as appropriate for class determination. The question
then would be whether class representation only to the specified
factual and legal damage issues carries with it the right to act as a
representative on the non-class damage issues. The predominance
of common issues in the first place must be decided, as must the
seeming desirability of assessing predominance within the three
broad areas of wrong, impact and damages, rather than on a more
narrow basis.
It would seem that the conceptual difficulties that permeate this
aspect of the application of rule 23 may stem from a certain incompatibility between two concepts embraced by the rule: 23 (a) provides that the numerous class will "sue or be sued" via the representative party; while 23(c) (4) provides for class treatment of
particular issues. The whole (the lawsuit) being is not ordinarily
equated with the part (the particular issue). That is, one does not
ordinarily "sue" except by asserting all of the elements of a cause
of action; and one does not recover damages except by establishing
all of these elements. Rule 23 apparently contemplates that the rep"'See

note 46 supra.

50 See Berman v. Narragansett Racing Ass'n, 48 F.R.D. 333 (D.R.I. 1969).
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resentative is to allege the entire cause of action and prove most of
it; but whether he is authorized to prove non-class issues and see
to the distribution of the proceeds is less clear.
Enthusiasm for rule 23 as a vehicle for enabling small claimants
to obtain justice does not necessarily justify a court in insisting that
the defendants must pay all of the damages they probably caused;
i.e., whether those injured seek justice. This is not the normal function of a court in civil litigation. The disciplinary benefits of treble
damage actions can be adequately secured by exacting less-thantotal retribution.
When it is not feasible to distribute directly the recovery to those
damaged, as in cases of widespread overcharges to users of public
transportation, for example,"7 there is an appealing quality of poetic
justice in requiring the recoveries to be applied for their indirect
benefit; but query whether this kind of enforcement is not better
left to administrative agencies.
Of course, the premise that silent class members are not claiming
their individual damages may be unsound if the class representation
actually extends to that issue. The "parens patriae" doctrine is
sometimes invoked to permit a sovereign, acting through a designated public official, to represent the citizenry in this regard. The
recent decision of the Supreme Court in Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co.," holding that there is no cause of action under the antitrust
laws for damage to the general economy of a state, seems to leave
open the use of the "parens patriae" approach under rule 23 in certain of cases. Presumably, different results may be reached depending upon varying state laws governing the authority of the public
official to perform such functions, upon the nature of the litigation
and the identifiability of class members.
X.

APPEALABILITY OF CLASS ACTION ORDERS

In Eisen v. Carlisle& Jacquelin," the Second Circuit has adopted
"7 E.g., Bebchick v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 318 F.2d 187, 203 (D.C. Cir.
1963).

" State of Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
" Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). For other applications of this doctrine, see Caceres v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 422
F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1970); City of New York v. International Pipe & Ceramics
Corp., 410 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1969); Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d

Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1968).

CLASS ACTIONS

19721

the rule that interlocutory appeal from an order denying class treatment is permissible if the order would, as a practicable matter,
terminate the litigation. In Hacket v. General Host Corporation0
the Third Circuit has rejected this approach, on the grounds of its
unequal application and unworkability. Under the Third Circuit
view, appellate review can be obtained only through discretionary
certification under section 1292,1 entry of judgment under rule
54(b)"2 or perhaps mandamus.
At issue is the application of the "collateral order" doctrine laid
down in Cohen v. Beneficial Finance Co.," in which the Supreme
Court upheld the right of interlocutory appeal from an order requiring plaintiff to post a bond as a condition of continuing with
the lawsuit. The Court stressed the serious effect of the order appealed from, its severability from the merits of the case and the
probability of irreparable harm if appellate review were deferred
until final judgment.
It is true that a denial of class treatment does not expressly bar
plaintiff's individual claim, nor does it terminate the claims of putative class members. The Eisen and Hackett opinions do not consider
the question of the effect of an order denying class treatment upon
later attempts by other class members to maintain a class action.
If the denial would not affect the later attempts, the courts' preoccupation with the amount of the named plaintiff's individual
claims appears justified there might be a gratifying shift of consummer class actions from the Third Circuit to the Second. But if,
as seems more realistic, the original denial would bar all other attempts to seek class treatment then the "death knell" would be
sounded in every case when any substantial number of claims could
not otherwise be litigated. At a minimum, the appealability could
not be resolved without considering the merits of the order appealed
from.
Thus, in view of the extremely broad discretion conferred upon
district courts in deciding class action issues, a strong argument
can be made that interlocutory review is desirable to eliminate oc"0Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir. 1972).
6128
62

U.S.C. § 1292 (1970).

FED.

R. Civ. P. 54(b).

e'Cohen v. Beneficial Finance Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
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casional instances of apparent arbitrariness and to promote uniformity of standards."
In summary, as the foregoing review indicates, not all problems
concerning rule 23 have yet been satisfactorily resolved. But counsel and the courts have shown willingness to be creative and cooperative in devising workable solutions. Already rule 23 is an undoubtedly useful tool in handling complex litigation and may ultimately prove to have been one of the most significant procedural
developments of the century.

"' See Note, Interlocutory Appeals from Order Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1970).

